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The Law Society of British Columbia
v. Trinity Western University:
Complicated Answers to a Simple
Question
Richard Moon*

I. INTRODUCTION
Trinity Western University (TWU) is an evangelical Christian
university, located in Langley, British Columbia. The university offers a
variety of programs, including professional programs in nursing and
education. In 2010, after many years of planning and preparation, TWU
applied to the various provincial law societies for accreditation of a law
program.
The graduates of an accredited program are eligible to take provincial
law society exams, and, if they pass these exams, to be called to the bar
in the particular province following a brief articling period. The
graduates of an unaccredited program may still be called to the
provincial bar but must satisfy some additional requirements. While
many of the provincial law societies were prepared to accredit the TWU
program, the law societies of British Columbia (LSBC) and Ontario
(LSUC/LSO) declined to do so.1
TWU had for some time required its students to sign a covenant that
prohibited them from engaging in certain behaviours, including sexual
intimacy outside heterosexual marriage. The law societies of British
Columbia and Ontario were concerned that this covenant would have the
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Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society (NSBS) also declined to accredit the TWU program.
However the provincial Court of Appeal held that the NSBS in refusing accreditation had acted
beyond its powers —Trinity Western University v. Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society, [2015] N.S.J.
No. 32, 2016 NSCA 59 (N.S.C.A.). The NSBS did not appeal the decision.
1
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effect of excluding gay and lesbian students from the program and, as a
consequence, would limit their access to the legal profession.2
TWU brought separate judicial review applications against the LSO
and the LSBC, arguing that each had acted outside its powers when it
refused to accredit the proposed law program. TWU claimed that the
statutory authority of the law societies, to regulate the legal profession in
the public interest, did not empower them to assess the school’s
admissions practices. TWU also argued that the decision of the law
societies not to accredit the program breached the TWU community’s
rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and in
particular section 2(a), freedom of religion.3
The Supreme Court of Canada heard the two cases together and
released its decision in each at the same time.4 The administrative law
issues in the two cases were not the same, since the decision-making
process followed by each of the law societies was different.5 However,
this comment will only address the freedom of religion issue, which was
the same in both cases. A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held
that the decision not to accredit the TWU program was reasonable, and
that any interference with the TWU community’s religious freedom was
justified in order to prevent discrimination against gay and lesbian
students in entry to law school and the legal profession.
The majority’s reasons, written by Abella J., were most fully
developed in the British Columbia case, and so my comments will focus
on that judgment. In both cases, separate concurring judgments were
written by McLachlin C.J.C. and by Rowe J. A dissenting judgment was
written jointly by Brown and Côté JJ.
Each of the judgments formally adheres to the standard model of
Charter adjudication and its reliance on balancing or proportionality. In
determining whether the LSBC’s refusal to accredit the TWU program,
the Court first considered whether the refusal amounted to a restriction
2
In its reasons the Supreme Court of Canada uses the term LGBTQ. I have chosen to use
the term “lesbian and gay” since the discrimination in this case was on the grounds of sexual
orientation.
3
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
4
Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32,
[2018] 2 S.C.R. 293 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “LSBC v. TWU”]; Trinity Western University v. Law
Society of Upper Canada, [2018] S.C.J. No. 33, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 453 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “TWU v.
LSUC”].
5
Notably the LSBC passed a resolution denying accreditation to the TWU program
following a referendum of the Society’s members on the issue.
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on the religious freedom of the TWU community contrary to section 2(a)
of the Charter and second, after finding a breach of section 2(a), they
considered whether the breach was justified under section 1 of the
Charter (or whether it was reasonable for the LSBC to conclude that the
reasons for restriction were proportionate to the school’s religious
freedom interests).
I will argue, however, that the task for the courts in this and other
religious freedom cases is not to balance competing civic and religious
interests, but is instead to mark the boundary between the spheres of
civic and spiritual life. More particularly, in this case, the issue was
whether TWU (in applying to operate an accredited law program) should
be viewed as a private religious institution that is free to govern itself
according to its own norms, or whether, because its actions may directly
impact outsiders to the religious group, it should be viewed as
performing a public role and therefore subject to non-discrimination and
other civic norms. The different judgments begin with different
assumptions about the public/private character of TWU (or at least its
proposed law program) and so never really address the key issue and
never really engage with each other.
In Part II of the article, I provide a short description and critique of
the earlier Supreme Court of Canada judgment in Trinity Western
University v. British Columbia College of Teachers,6 and note that the
focus in that case was on the graduates — the output — of the TWU
teacher training program and whether they might, as teachers, be more
likely to engage in discrimination against LGBTQ students. In the two
cases, which are the subject of this comment, the focus instead is on the
applicants — the input of the program — and whether the Covenant
would have the effect of excluding gay and lesbian students not simply
from the program but also from the legal profession. Part III of the article
describes and discusses the different judgments in the case, and notes
that the conclusions reached in the majority and dissenting judgments
rest on different assumptions about the character of TWU (or its
proposed law program) as either public or private and suggests that the
public/private character of the institution is the very thing that is at issue
in the case. Part IV considers the reasons for, and the general scope of,
religious accommodation under section 2(a) of the Charter. It argues that
the state’s obligation to make space for religious practice (and sometimes
to compromise its policies) rests on a concern about the status and
6

[2001] S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “TWU v. BCCT”].
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vitality of religious groups. It further argues that accommodation claims
are not resolved though the balancing of competing civic and religious
interests; and that instead the task for the courts in these cases is to mark
the boundary between civic and religious spheres of life — to define the
scope of personal and communal religious practice that should be
insulated from legal regulation. This part focuses in particular on the
claim of religious associations or communities to be free to operate
according to their own norms and practices, and insulated from public
anti-discrimination requirements. It argues that the central issue in such
cases is whether the association should be viewed as private — because
its actions impact only members of the group — or whether instead it
should be seen as performing a public role because its actions directly
impact outsiders or non-members. This then leads to the discussion in
Part V about whether TWU, when operating an accredited law program,
should be regarded as a private religious association that is insulated
from public anti-discrimination norms or instead as public and subject to
anti-discrimination norms because its admissions criteria directly impact
outsiders to the community. It argues that because admission to law
school continues to be a significant barrier to entry into the legal
profession in Canada, the TWU Covenant would have an impact on nonmembers. Part VI considers whether TWU’s recent decision to remove
the Covenant addresses the concerns raised in the case and suggests that
the answer to this may not be straightforward. And finally in Part VII, I
make a few brief observations about the future of religious freedom
jurisprudence in the wake of this decision.

II. THE EARLIER TWU DECISION
In 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada considered a similar issue
raised in LSBC v. TWU and that also involved TWU. In Trinity Western
University v. British Columbia College of Teachers (BCCT), the Court
held that the BCCT acted outside its powers when it refused to accredit a
teacher-training program at TWU.7 The BCCT believed that the program
would not adequately prepare students to teach in the public-school
7
Trinity Western University v British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] S.C.J. No. 32,
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 (S.C.C.). I have discussed the case more extensively in R. Moon, “The Supreme
Court of Canada’s Attempt to Reconcile Freedom of Religion and Sexual Orientation Equality in the
Public Schools” in D. Rayside and C. Wilcox, eds., Faith, Politics and Sexual Diversity
(Vancouver/Toronto: UBC Press, 2011).
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system in British Columbia because it affirmed the view that
homosexuality was sinful. In making this decision the BCCT referred
specifically to the Contract of Responsibilities signed by teachers and
students that prohibited “homosexual behaviour” and other activities.
According to the BCCT, an institution that wishes to train teachers for
the public school system must “provide an institutional setting that
appropriately prepares future teachers for the public school environment,
and in particular for the diversity of public school students”, which,
because of the Contract, the TWU program did not do.8
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, in a judgment written
by Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ., accepted that the denial of accreditation
“places a burden on members of a particular religious group ...
preventing them from expressing freely their religious beliefs and
associating to put them into practice.”9 In the majority’s view, the BCCT
decision meant that TWU must abandon its religiously based
“community standards” if it is to run a program that trains teachers for
the public school system. Graduates of TWU “are likewise affected
because the affirmation of their religious beliefs and attendance at TWU
will not lead to certification as public school teachers...”.10 “The issue at
the heart of this appeal, said the majority, “is how to reconcile the
religious freedoms of individuals wishing to attend TWU with the
equality concerns of students in B.C.’s public school system”.11
The majority, however, found no reason to deny accreditation to the
TWU program. The majority agreed that if a teacher engages in
discriminatory conduct, he/she “can be subject to disciplinary
proceedings”; but maintained that the right of gays and lesbians to be
free from discrimination is not violated simply because a teacher holds
discriminatory views.12 In the majority’s view, “the proper place to draw
the line in cases like the one at bar is generally between belief and
conduct.”13 A teacher may believe that homosexuality is sinful or
wrongful, but as long as she/he does not act on those views, denying
benefits to, or imposing burdens on, particular individuals because of
their sexual orientation, she/he will not be found to have breached their
right to equality. The majority found no evidence that any TWU graduate
8
9
10
11
12
13

TWU v. BCCT, id., at para. 11.
Id., at para. 32.
Id.
Id., at para. 28.
Id., at para. 37.
Id., at para. 36.
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had acted in a discriminatory way in the classroom. And so the limitation
on the religious freedom of the staff and graduates of TWU (the denial of
accreditation) was imposed in the absence of any evidence that the
program had a detrimental impact on the school system. In the absence
of “concrete evidence that training teachers at TWU fosters
discrimination in the public schools of B.C.” the BCCT had no grounds
to deny accreditation to TWU and interfere with the religious freedom of
TWU instructors and students to hold certain beliefs.14
The majority judgment seemed to say that had there been evidence of
clear and direct acts of discrimination on the part of TWU graduates, the
BCCT would have been justified in refusing to accredit the TWU
teacher-training program. Yet, it is not clear why this should be so. Once
the Court distinguished between anti-gay/anti-lesbian belief and action,
and accepted that a teacher may hold such beliefs, provided she/he does
not act on them, why was it relevant whether any TWU graduates had
engaged in acts of discrimination? If belief and action are separable in
this way (public action as wrongful and personal belief as not), then
TWU, even though it supported anti-gay and anti-lesbian views, should
not be held responsible for any discriminatory actions taken by its
graduates. Similarly, the improper actions of some graduates should not
affect the accreditation of other graduates who may believe that
homosexuality is immoral but refrain from engaging in acts of
discrimination. The tension in the majority’s reasoning, I suspect, reflects
a deeper uncertainty about the distinction between belief and action in
the school context.
While the distinction between belief and action is central in human
rights codes (which prohibit acts of discrimination in the market but do
not otherwise regulate an individual’s beliefs or the decisions she/he
makes concerning private matters), it may not be applicable to the role of
a teacher in a public school. An important part of a teacher’s role is to
teach his or her students basic values, including tolerance for different
religious belief systems and respect for the equal worth of all people. As
the majority in TWU v. BCCT observed, “... Schools are meant to develop
civic virtue and responsible citizenship, to educate in an environment
free of bias, prejudice and intolerance.”15 Teachers, though, do not
simply instruct students in these values. They are role models and
counsellors. If sexual-orientation equality is to be affirmed in the public
14
15

Id.
Id., at para. 13.
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schools, teachers must do more than simply refrain from direct acts of
discrimination against gay and lesbian students. A teacher when
confronted with bigoted words from students about gays and lesbians
should contradict those words or when approached by a student who is
struggling with her/his sexual identity should provide support and
reassurance or direct her/him to an individual or group that can offer
support. Because the public values of the school curriculum (broadly
understood) are taught by example and because they must be affirmed in
different ways, it may be that a teacher who is not personally committed
to these values cannot perform her/his role effectively.
This is not to say that individual teachers should be closely examined
on their views about sexual-orientation equality (or racial or gender
equality). A serious probe into the individual’s thoughts or attitudes about
sexual orientation might involve too great an invasion into his/her
personal sphere. Nor should we preclude an individual from teaching in
the public schools simply because we suspect she/he may be racist or
homophobic — because, for example, she/he belongs to a particular
church or attended a particular religious school. But this is not the same
as saying that it is all right to employ an anti-gay or anti-lesbian teacher
provided he/she refrains from explicit acts of discrimination in the
classroom. A teacher should be excluded from the schools, if she/he has
indicated in his/her public statements or actions that he/she regards
homosexuality as sinful or objectionable, even though there is no
evidence that he/she has directly discriminated against gays and lesbians
in the classroom. She/He should be excluded because discrimination is
sometimes subtle and difficult to prove but also because a teacher should
do more than simply tolerate gays and lesbians.
In Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, the Supreme Court
of Canada held that an individual who holds racist views, as evidenced
by her words or actions outside the classroom, may be disqualified from
serving as a classroom teacher in the public schools.16 Justice La Forest,
for the Court, upheld the decision of an adjudicator, appointed under the
New Brunswick Human Rights Act, that ordered the School Board to
remove from the classroom a teacher who had expressed in a public
setting racist views, which he claimed were religiously based. In Ross,
there was no evidence that the teacher had treated any minority students
in his class unfairly, or differently from other students, or had deviated
from the curriculum and taught racist views. However, because Mr. Ross
16

[1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ross”].
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had expressed racist opinions at public meetings and in the local media,
students in his school (and the general community) had come to know of
his views. The Court found that Mr. Ross’s public racist statements had
“poisoned” the learning environment in the school.17
The Court in Ross recognized that a teacher is a role model, an
authority figure, and a conduit for public values. Public knowledge of
Mr. Ross’s racist views mattered because his support for such views
might have legitimized them in the minds of some students and
undermined the school’s affirmation of racial equality. If all that is
expected of a teacher is that he/she refrain from teaching racist views,
then it might be possible to separate what he/she says and does in the
classroom from what he/she says and does outside, on his/her own time.
There are very few jobs from which an individual would be dismissed
because she/he (publicly) expressed racist views after work hours (unless
contrary to the Criminal Code). Moreover, there are views that a teacher
is not permitted to express inside the classroom but is free to express
outside. For example, a teacher should not expressly support the Liberal
Party, or the Communist Party, inside the classroom but is permitted to
do so outside. We expect the teacher in the classroom to remain neutral
on issues of partisan politics. But in the case of racial equality, we expect
more than formal neutrality in the classroom. We expect the teacher to
positively support the value of equality. A teacher who publicly affirms
racist views cannot perform this role. It would seem even more obvious
that a teacher-training program that affirms such views does not
adequately prepare its graduates to teach in the public school system.
This takes me to the more fundamental error in the Court’s decision.
The issue in the TWU case was not whether a particular graduate and
prospective teacher might be anti-gay or anti-lesbian because he/she
attended an educational institute that affirmed anti-gay or anti-lesbian
views. It was, instead, whether a teacher-training program that affirmed
values that are incompatible with those of the civic curriculum should be
denied accreditation because it will not adequately prepare its students to
teach in the public school system — a system in which gays and lesbians
should be treated with equal respect and not simply tolerated. Had the
BCCT denied accreditation to a teacher training program that had a racist
element in its curriculum, it seems unlikely that the BCCT’s decision
would have been overturned by the Court, even though not every
graduate of the program would carry the lesson of racism with him.
17

Id., at paras. 40-41.
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A program that taught or affirmed values so fundamentally at odds with
the basic civic values of the public school system would not be
accredited. Yet TWU sought accreditation for a program that supported
values the BCCT thought were incompatible with the civic mission of the
public schools — based on the public commitment to sexual-orientation
equality expressed in both provincial and federal human rights codes.
The existence of TWU, and more specifically its teacher-training
program, rests on a belief that the values of those who teach are
important in the education process. TWU recognizes that its students will
become better Christians, or Christian school teachers, if they are taught
in an environment that is fully Christian in its values and practices. This
is why TWU requires that all instructors adhere to its code of conduct.
Even if anti-gay views are not an explicit part of the teacher-training
program, they form part of the ethos of TWU.
Perhaps because of this decision, the law societies in LSBC v. TWU
and TWU v. LSUC did not rely on the argument that a law school that
teaches its students that homosexuality is wrongful or immoral will not
properly prepare lawyers for practice in the general community. Instead
they justified the decision not to accredit the TWU law program on the
discriminatory impact of the Covenant on admission to the program and
to the legal profession.18

III. THE JUDGMENTS IN LSBC V. TWU
1. The Majority Judgment of Justice Abella
Justice Abella, writing for the majority, held that, when deciding
whether or not to accredit a law program, the LSBC “was entitled to be
concerned that inequitable barriers on entry to law schools would
effectively impose inequitable barriers on entry to the profession and risk
decreasing diversity within the bar.”19 She noted that the Law Society’s

18
The majority in Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers,
[2001] S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772, at para. 25 (S.C.C.), rejected in a cursory way the claim
that the Contract would have a discriminatory effect on gay and lesbian applicants.
19
Trinity Western University v. Law Society of British Columbia, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32,
[2018] 2 S.C.R. 293, at para. 39 (S.C.C.). And id., at para. 31: “In our view, the LPA [Legal
Profession Act] requires Benchers to consider the overarching objective of protecting the public
interest in determining the requirements for admission to the profession, including whether to
approve a particular law school.” And id., at para. 41: “Limiting access to membership in the legal
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overarching statutory objective was “to uphold and protect the public
interest in the administration of justice” and that this was stated “in the
broadest possible terms.”20 She rejected TWU’s claim that the law
society, in refusing to accredit its program, was intervening in the
internal affairs of a private religious association, because she viewed the
Covenant as a barrier not simply to entry into law school, but also to
entry into the legal profession.
Justice Abella accepted that the LSBC’s decision not to accredit the
TWU program breached the religious freedom of the members of the
TWU community and of the evangelical students who might wish to
attend TWU to study law. She noted that the members of the TWU
community believed that it was important to study with others who share
their Christian beliefs “or are prepared to honour those beliefs in their
conduct”.21 Justice Abella acknowledged that the mandatory covenant
“makes it easier” for evangelical Christians “to adhere to their faith”,
because it created “an environment where their moral discipline is not
constantly tested.”22 It followed then that the LSBC decision not to
accredit the TWU program interfered with “the right of TWU’s
community members to enhance their spiritual development through
studying law in an environment defined by their religious beliefs”.23
However, Abella J. went on to find that the decision by the LSBC to
deny accreditation to the TWU law program was reasonable and that it
reflected “a proportionate balancing of Charter protection with the
statutory mandate”.24 She found that the LSBC’s decision did not
significantly limit religious freedom, first, because it only denied
approval to the TWU program as long as it included the mandatory
covenant and second, because (she thought) the TWU community
regarded the Covenant as desirable but not essential to their spiritual life
— “as preferred (rather than necessary) for their spiritual growth.”25
profession on the basis of personal characteristics, unrelated to merit, is inherently inimical to the
integrity of the legal profession.”
20
Id., at paras. 32-33.
21
Id., at para. 65. And further, id., at para. 70:
...It is clear from the record that evangelical members of TWU’s community sincerely
believe that studying in a community defined by religious beliefs in which members
follow particular religious rules of conduct contributes to their spiritual development. In
our view, this is the religious belief or practice implicated by the LSBC’s decision.
22
Id., at para. 72.
23
Id., at para. 75.
24
Id., at para. 79.
25
Id., at para. 88. She also noted id., at para, 87, that “the limitation in this case is of minor
significance because a mandatory covenant is, on the record before us, not absolutely required for
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In her view, the Law Society’s refusal to accredit a program with such a
covenant did not prevent evangelical Christians from practising their
religion “as and where they choose.”26
On the other side of the balance, Abella J. found that the LSBC
decision to deny accreditation to the TWU program “significantly
advanced … the public interest in the administration of justice … by
maintaining equal access to and diversity in the legal profession.”27 She
recognized that gay and lesbian students would be deterred from
applying to the program because of the Covenant’s ban on same-sex
intimacy. The consequence of this is “that the 60 law school seats created
by TWU’s proposed law school will be effectively closed to the vast
majority of LGBTQ students” with the further consequence that qualified
LGBTQ candidates may be prevented from entering the legal
profession.28 Even though the TWU program will create more law school
spaces, the Covenant means that “LGBTQ individuals would have fewer
opportunities relative to others” thereby “undermin[ing] true equality of
access to legal education, and by extension, the legal profession.”29
Justice Abella acknowledged the collective or shared dimension of
religious belief and practice; yet her focus remained on the individual.30
Her account of the communal dimension of the freedom seemed to
involve no more than a recognition that an individual’s beliefs and
practices are often shared with others and that an individual may
sometimes attach value to worshipping with others or joining with others
to pursue common spiritual aims. The individual remains the locus of
belief and the focus of protection in the majority’s section 2(a) analysis.
This enabled the majority to discount collective practice as simply a
preference of individual believers. The (individual) members of the TWU
community might prefer to teach or study in an environment in which
others share and adhere to the same beliefs/practices, but the majority

the religious practice at issue: namely, to study law in a Christian learning environment in which
people follow certain religious rules of conduct.”
26
Id., at para. 102.
27
Id., at paras. 92-93.
28
Id., at para. 93.
29
Id., at para. 95.
30
Id., at para. 64 accepted that “...[t]he protection of individual religious rights under s. 2(a)
must … account for the socially embedded nature of religious belief, as well as the ‘deep linkages
between this belief and its manifestation through communal institutions and traditions’”. Religious
adherents must be free to “come together and create cohesive communities of belief and practice”.
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saw this as a kind of second-order belief about joining with others.31 Yet,
as I will discuss shortly in Part IV, it is difficult to account for the value
of religious belief/practice from an external or secular perspective (and
the obligation of the state to make effort to accommodate religious
practices or norms) without recognizing the deep connection between the
individual adherent and the religious community or tradition with which
she/he associates.32
2. The Concurring Judgment of Chief Justice McLachlin
Chief Justice McLachlin agreed with the majority that the Law
Society’s decision not to accredit the proposed TWU law program
breached the spiritual community’s religious freedom — and in
particular “its members’ beliefs that they must be in an institution with
others who share or respect their practices on sexual relations.”33
However, McLachlin C.J.C. took issue with the majority’s discounting of
this communal practice as simply a preference of individual believers.
The Chief Justice saw a contradiction in the majority’s approach, which
on the one hand acknowledged “the deep sincerity of the [TWU
community’s] belief in a religious practice and then, on the other hand,
doubt[ed] that sincerity by calling the practice relatively insignificant.”34
She observed that studying in a religious learning environment, in which
the members have agreed to live in a certain way, is a long and
“passionately held tradition.”35 She also noted that religious schools such
as TWU have a tradition of “welcoming non-adherents as students,
provided they agree to abide by the norms of the community” and that a
31

For a thoughtful discussion of the institutional standing of TWU to bring such a claim see
K. Chan, “Identifying the Institutional Religious Freedom Claimant” (2017) Vol. 95, No. 3 Cdn Bar
Rev. 707.
32
In a few previous judgments, such as Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General),
[2015] S.C.J. No. 12, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court of Canada has made general
observations about the communal dimension of religious freedom and the standing of religious
organizations to bring challenges under s. 2(a) of the Charter. But, as in LSBC v. TWU, id., the Court
in these cases simply recognizes that individuals sometimes perform religious practices in
combination with others. There is little or no recognition of the constitutive character of religious
adherence or membership.
33
In the view of McLachlin C.J.C., LSBC v. TWU, id., at para. 125, the LSBC decision (at
para. 129) “places a burden on the TWU community’s freedom of religion: (1) by interfering with a
religious practice (a learning environment that conforms to its members’ beliefs); (2) by restricting
their right to express their beliefs through that practice; and (3) by restricting their ability to associate
as required by their beliefs.”
34
Id., at para. 131.
35
Id., at para. 130.
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student who did not agree with the school’s practices did not have to
attend, and further that if they did decide to attend and agreed to conform
to its practices, they could not be said to have been compelled to do so.36
Nevertheless, McLachlin C.J.C. thought that the Law Society’s
decision not to accredit the TWU program was reasonable. In her view,
“the most compelling law society objective” was not to ensure diversity
in law school or legal practice (since the TWU program would make not
much of a difference to diversity in the profession) but was instead “the
imperative of refusing to condone discrimination against LGBTQ people,
pursuant to the LSBC’s statutory obligation to protect the public
interest.”37 She thought that accrediting the TWU program was
incompatible with the Law Society’s “duty to combat discrimination”.38
She concluded that the Law Society’s decision not to accredit the
program “represents a proportionate balancing of freedom of religion, on
the one hand, and the avoidance of discrimination, on the other.”39
Yet the Law Society’s decision to accredit the TWU program could be
seen as condoning a discriminatory program only if the Law Society has
the authority or responsibility not to accredit such a program. There is a
circularity to her claim. If, as McLachlin C.J.C. argued, the interference
with TWU’s religious freedom is not minor then that must be because the
School is a religious institution that should be free to operate according
to its own norms and to decide its own rules for membership. But, if, as
the Chief Justice also argued, the LSBC was justified in declining to
accredit the program, that must be because TWU (in operating a law
program) is not simply a private religious organization and so can be
required to respect public anti-discrimination norms.
3. The Concurring Judgment of Justice Rowe
Justice Rowe, in his concurring judgment, found no breach of section
2(a) and so did not need to assess the competing civic and religious
36

Id., at para. 133.
Id., at para. 137.
38
Id., at para. 147. Chief Justice McLachlin noted that balancing in s. 2(a) cases is often difficult,
because religious belief/practice is generally absolute, making compromise impossible. The Court then is put
to a hard choice — either to recognize the religious practice or not (either to accredit or not) and cannot
simply trade-off the competing interests. She may be pointing here to the reality that these issues are not
resolved through balancing and instead require the courts to distinguish the spheres of religious and civil life.
39
Id., at para. 108. However, id., at para. 112 she disagreed with the majority’s general
approach and in particular its understanding and application of the Doré proportionality analysis:
Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, 2012 SCC 12 (S.C.C.).
37
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claims or to engage in any form of balancing or proportionality
analysis.40 According to Rowe J., freedom of religion under the Charter,
prohibits the state from interfering with the individual’s “most personal
beliefs … that speak to the core of who we are and how we choose to
live our lives”.41 In his view, freedom of religion is about “personal
autonomy or choice” and is based on the idea that no one should be
“forced to adhere or to refrain from a particular set of religious
beliefs”.42
He accepted that religion has a communal aspect that is protected
under section 2(a); but like the majority, he regarded the communal
aspect of religion as simply an expression of individual choice — the
freedom to choose to worship with others or to pursue certain spiritual
objectives together with others.43
Justice Rowe acknowledged that the LSBC decision may have
interfered with the belief of TWU community members that “the
proscription of sexual intimacy outside marriage” should be imposed “on
all students attending the proposed law school at TWU”.44 However, he
regarded this as simply a preference on the part of the TWU members
and took the view that section 2(a) protects only practices that the
individual sincerely believes are required. It is difficult, though, to
reconcile this view with earlier Supreme Court of Canada judgments
such as Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem,45 in which the Court seemed to
say that section 2(a) protects religious practices even if they are not
understood by the individual or group to be mandatory. Justices Brown
and Côté in their dissenting judgment note that the majority in Amselem
stated that “[i]t is the religious or spiritual essence of an action, not any
40

LSBC v. TWU, id., at para. 155, Rowe J. described law school admission as the “first
point of entry” into the profession and in this way tied access to law school to access to the
profession.
41
Id., at para. 209. Religion, according to Rowe J. at paras. 212-213, “at its core, involves a
profoundly personal commitment to a set of beliefs and to various practices seen as following from
those beliefs” and so “the focus of religious freedom … is personal choice … made freely.” It
follows from this then that religious freedom is “defined by the absence of constraint.”
42
Id., at para. 251: “For this reason, it [freedom of religion] protects against interference
with profoundly personal beliefs and with the voluntary choice to abide by the practices those beliefs
require.”
43
In Rowe J.’s view, in LSBC v. TWU, id., at para. 219, a religious community or
institution is a voluntary association of individual believers who choose “to join together on the basis
of their common faith” and to adopt and adhere to certain “rules and membership requirements”. It
followed then that while the members of the TWU community may have s. 2(a) rights, TWU itself,
as an institution, did not have rights under s. 2(a).
44
Id., at para. 228.
45
[2004] S.C.J. No. 46, 2004 SCC 47 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Amselem”].
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mandatory or perceived-as-mandatory nature of its observance, that
attracts protection.”46
Moreover, said Rowe J., even if section 2(a) protected religious
preferences, in this case the preference or belief is concerned with the
conduct of non-believers — of “those who have freely chosen not to
believe” and so “falls outside the scope of the freedom.”47 The “coercion
of non-believers” is not protected under the Charter.48 The freedom, he
emphasized, “does not protect measures by which an individual or a faith
community seeks to impose adherence to their religious beliefs or
practices on others who do not share their underlying faith.”49 His view
of the Covenant and its impact on non-believers, rests on an assumption
that TWU is not simply a private religious association, with an entirely
voluntary membership.50
4. The Dissenting Judgment of Justices Côté and Brown
The dissenting judges, Côté and Brown JJ., disagreed with the
majority on the two central issues before the Court. First, they thought
that the Law Society’s authority to regulate the profession in the public
interest did not allow it to intervene in the internal operations of a law
school, including the School’s admissions policies. Second, the
dissenting judges held that the Law Society’s decision not to accredit the
proposed program breached the section 2(a) rights of the TWU
community and that this breach was not justified under section 1 of the
Charter.
According to the dissenting judges, the Law Society’s role in
assessing the proposed law program is simply “to ensure that individual
46
Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32,
[2018] 2 S.C.R. 293, at para. 317 (S.C.C.) — quoting Amselem. Justice Iacobucci, writing for the
majority in Amselem, id., at para. 75, also said this: “... For the purposes of determining if freedom of
religion is triggered or whether there is a non-trivial interference therewith, there is no distinction
between sincere belief that a practice is required and sincere belief that a practice, having a nexus
with religion, engenders a connection with the divine or with the subject or object of a person’s
spiritual faith.”
47
LSBC v. TWU, id., at para. 239 (emphasis added).
48
Id.
49
Id., at para. 251.
50
Id., at para. 242.
[B]y means of the mandatory Covenant — the claimants seek to require others outside
their religious community to conform to their religious practices. I can find no decision
by this Court to the effect that s. 2(a) protects such a right to impose adherence to
religious practices on those who do not voluntarily adhere thereto.
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graduates are fit to become members of the legal profession because they
meet minimum standards of competence and ethical conduct.”51 The Law
Society’s public interest mandate enables it to regulate the legal
profession in the province, but “does not extend to the governance of law
schools” and their admissions policies and does not entitle it “to police
human rights standards in law schools.”52 Moreover, said the dissenting
judges, tolerance for religious diversity is itself a matter of public
interest: “...Acceptance by the LSBC of the unequal access effected by
the Covenant would signify the accommodation of difference and of the
TWU community’s right to religious freedom, and not condonation of
discrimination against LGBTQ persons.”53
The dissenting judges, though, went on to say that even if the LSBC’s
public interest mandate was broader and allowed the Law Society to consider
factors “other than fitness”, the decision not to accredit TWU’s proposed
program “unjustifiably limited the TWU community’s freedom of religion.”54
The dissenting judges stressed the importance of the “relational or
communal” dimension of religious freedom, which involves “more than
simply aggregating individual rights claims under the amorphous
umbrella of an institution’s ‘community’”.55 They noted that the
members of the TWU community sincerely believed that “studying,
51

Id., at para. 267.
Id., at paras. 273 and 288. They further noted, id., at para. 290, that the Law Society’s
role as gatekeeper to the legal profession does not extend “all the way back to the law school’s
threshold.” And id., at para. 291:
...Any harms to marginalized communities in the context of legal education must be
considered by provincial human rights tribunals, by legislatures, and by members of the
executive, which grant such institutions the power to confer degrees. The LSBC is not a
roving, free-floating agent of the state. It cannot take it upon itself to police such matters
when they lie beyond its mandate.
Indeed, the dissenting judges assumed, id., at para. 268, that the TWU covenant is “a code of
conduct protected by provincial human rights legislation”. But, of course, the Human Rights Code
does not give general protection to a religious organization’s rules; it simply exempts the
organization’s rules from the application of the Code’s anti-discrimination requirements. In other
words, it does not protect TWU’s norms and practices from other forms of regulation or oversight —
and certainly does not entitle its law program to law society accreditation. And as later noted, the
dissenters’ assertion assumes that the Covenant is an internal rule of a private religious association.
53
Id., at para. 269.
54
Id., at para. 268.
55
Id., at para. 315. Justices Bown and Côté further noted, id., at para. 327 that, “In our
view, however, the majority fails to appreciate that the unequal access resulting from the Covenant is
a function of accommodating religious freedom, which itself advances the public interest by
promoting diversity in a liberal, pluralist society.” In their view, id., at para. 335, the purpose of
TWU’s admissions policy was not to exclude LGBTQ students but instead “to establish a code of
conduct which ensures the vitality of its religious community.”
52
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teaching and working in a post-secondary educational environment”
where all participants agree to adhere to certain principles and practices,
was spiritually important.56 According to the dissenting judges,
section 2(a) protects “the freedom of members of the TWU
community to express their religious beliefs through the Covenant and to
associate with one another in order to study law in an educational
community which reflects their religious beliefs.”57 They thought that the
refusal to accredit the TWU law program was a profound interference
“with the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of a community of coreligionists to insist upon certain moral commitments from those who
wish to join the private space within which it pursues its religiously
based practices.”58 In their view, the LSBC’s denial of accreditation to
the TWU program “undermines the core character of a lawful religious
institution and disrupts the vitality of the TWU community”.59
The dissenting judges also found that this interference with TWU’s
section 2(a) rights was not justified under section 1. They thought that
the majority undervalued the religious claim of TWU by treating it as
simply an individual preference rather than as a collective right to live in
a community of shared values. The dissenting judges accepted that
religious practices may be limited when they cause injury to others, but
found that in this case because the Covenant was simply an internal
matter, there was no “legally cognizable injury”.60
5. The Assumptions Underlying the Different Judgments
The conclusions reached in the majority and dissenting judgments rest
on very different assumptions, that are unarticulated and undefended,
56
Id., at para. 319. And, id., at para. 322: “For members of the TWU community, religious
belief and education are inextricably linked”.
57
Id., at para. 316 (emphasis in original).
58
Id., at para. 261.
59
Id., at para. 324, citing Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J.
No. 12, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 613, at para. 67 (S.C.C.). In the dissenting judges’ view LSBC v. TWU, id.,
at para. 268, the decision not to accredit the proposed program “is a profound interference with
religious freedom” and inconsistent with “the state’s duty of religious neutrality.” They insisted, id.,
at para. 332, that secularism “... [p]roperly understood … connotes pluralism and respect for
diversity, not the suppression of full participation in society by imposing a forced choice between
conformity with a single majoritarian norm and withdrawal from the public square.” The dissenting
judges, id., at para. 333, defined the scope of state power narrowly: “Simply put, the secular state is a
neutral state, which refrains from espousing ‘values’ that undermine or go beyond what is necessary
for the civic participation of all.”
60
LSBC v. TWU, id., at para. 332.
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about the character of TWU (or its proposed law program) as either
public or private. But the public/private character of the institution is the
very thing that is at issue in the case. The consequence of this — of
assuming rather than determining the character of the institution or the
law program — is that the two judgments never actually engage with
each other.
The majority viewed the proposed TWU program as public in
character, because it understood admission into an accredited law
program to be part of the process for determining who enters the legal
profession. The majority thought that, in operating an accredited law
school and deciding who to admit to the School, and ultimately to the
legal profession, TWU would no longer be acting as simply a private
religious organization and its covenant would no longer be simply an
internal rule, applicable only to members of the religious community.
The dissenting judges, on the other hand, assumed that TWU is a
private religious institution that should be free to regulate its internal
affairs according to its spiritual norms.61 In the view of the dissenting
judges, any interference with a religious association’s internal operations
or with its ability to access the benefits of public life, amounts to a
breach of the association’s religious freedom. The dissenting judges did
not consider whether TWU’s entry into public life — its participation in
deciding who enters the legal profession — might mean that it was no
longer acting simply as a private religious organization serving or
overseeing only those who choose to be members of the spiritual
community.
Both judgments then went on to engage in a superficial balancing of
religious and civic interests. Yet, in neither judgment was much said
about the substance of the competing claims or interests. Because the
majority thought the desire to study in a religious community was simply
an individual preference they were able to uphold the restriction with
little explanation. For the dissenting judges, because TWU was a private
religious organization any rule regulating entry was simply an internal
matter, and so caused no real injury to others.

61

For example, Brown and Côté JJ., id., at para. 265 (emphasis in original):
[A] court of law, particularly when dealing with claims of constitutionally guaranteed
rights including freedom of religion, must have regard to the legal principles that guide
the relationship between citizen and state, between private and public. And those
principles exist to protect rights-holders from values which a state actor deems to be
‘shared’, not to give licence to courts to defer to or impose those values.
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IV. RESTRICTION AND ACCOMMODATION
1. Reasons for Accommodation
Religious accommodation (exempting a religious practice from
ordinary law) may rest on a variety of concerns. Charles Taylor and
Jocelyn Maclure argue that accommodation may be necessary to prevent
the “moral harm” that occurs when individuals are required to act in a
way that is inconsistent with their deepest convictions or commitments,
both religious and non-religious.62 Yet, in a democracy, the strongly or
deeply-held views of citizens on civic issues shape public policy, with
the consequence that the views of some citizens prevail over those of
others. In only very exceptional circumstances have the courts been
willing to excuse an individual from performing his/her legal duties
simply because she/he is opposed to the law on moral grounds.63 Indeed,
most of the accommodation claims that come before the courts involve
religious rituals or practices (forms of collective worship or markers of
cultural identity or group membership) rather than religious/moral
convictions. These practices may not even be binding on the individual
and so are not easily described as “deeply-held”, at least not in the way
this term is often used.
The justification for accommodation (and the treatment of a religious
practice as a matter of identity rather than choice) rests more credibly on
a concern about the status or vitality of religious groups, rather than on
the value of individual liberty. Accommodation should be made for the
practices of different religious groups, because these groups are a source
of identity and meaning for their members. Indeed, if the individual’s
religious beliefs or moral commitments are deep or rooted (and ought to
be insulated from politics), it is because they are part of (and grew out
of) a shared religious tradition or group culture to which his/her identity
(his/her world view and sense of place in the world) is tied.64 Religious
association lies at the core of the individual’s worldview. It orients the
individual in the social world, shapes his/her perception of the natural
62
J. Maclure and C. Taylor (Trans. Jane Marie Todd), Secularism and Freedom of
Conscience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).
63
The most obvious example is conscientious objection to military service. For a discussion
see R. Moon, “Concientious Objections in Canada: Pragmatic Accommodation and Principled
Adjudication” (2018) 7 OJLR 274.
64
R. Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem” (2005),
29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 201-220, at 216.
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order, and provides a framework for her/his actions. More practically,
accommodation should sometimes be made to avoid the marginalization
of such groups within the larger community. If the law prevents the
members of some religious groups from fully participating in society,
their identification or connection with that society may be negatively
affected and this in turn may result in social conflict. The ties between
religious group members, which may be intergenerational and
comprehensive, make the group particularly vulnerable to suspicion,
discrimination, and marginalization. Accommodation may seem
particularly appropriate when the restrictive law supports dominant
cultural practices, some of which (such as holidays) may be religious in
origin.
The Court, as earlier noted, has had difficulty acknowledging the
group or collective character of religion — and religious freedom — for
reasons that are understandable. Within any religious community or
tradition there is an enormous diversity of belief and practice. The
followers of a religious tradition may interpret scripture or apply the
practices of the tradition in different ways, and yet still understand
themselves to be members of that tradition — as Christians or Jews or
Buddhists. They may identify with a religious tradition or belief system
in different ways, with different levels of commitment and degrees of
involvement. This is a reminder of the way in which religion is both a
matter of cultural identity and personal commitment — that it is a system
or tradition that individual members understand, and identify with, in
particular or personal ways. The challenge for the courts has been to fit
this complex conception of religious adherence (as a matter of both
personal judgment and cultural identity) into a constitutional rights
framework that draws a distinction between individual choices that
should be protected as a matter of liberty (subject to limits in the public
interest) and collective identity that should be respected as a matter of
equality. The liberal rights framework imposes this distinction between
judgment (choice) and identity (attribute) on the rich and complex
experience of religious commitment — the commitment of an individual
to a religious tradition or shared spiritual life.
2. Balances and Boundaries
Despite what the Court says, religious accommodation claims are not,
and cannot be, resolved through the balancing of civic and religious
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interests. A court has no way to attach value or weight to a religious
belief/practice. From a secular or public perspective, a religious
belief/practice has no necessary or recognizable value; indeed, it is said
that a court should take no position concerning its value — that the court
should remain neutral on the question of religious truth. The
belief/practice is significant, from a civic-secular perspective, because it
matters “deeply” to the group and its members or because it is part of
their cultural identity. There is no way to balance this concern about
group identity and marginalization against the purpose or value of the
restrictive law.65
The courts’ task is not to trade off or balance competing
values/interests but is instead to mark out a protected space for religious
communities or ways of life — to define the scope of personal or
communal religious practice that can be practically insulated (and
excluded) from legal regulation. Religious freedom, as a constitutional
right in a democratic political system, must be limited in what it protects
to matters that can be viewed as private and outside the scope of
politics.66 The protection of religious freedom then requires the courts to
draw a line between the spheres of spiritual and civic life.
65
Richard Moon, Freedom of Conscience and Religion (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014), at
134ff [hereinafter “Moon, Freedom of Conscience”]. In this way religious freedom is different from
rights, such as freedom of expression, which is protected because there is value in the activity of
expression (its contribution to democracy, knowledge, individual agency). Limits on freedom of
expression rest on public values or interests, such as preventing the spread of hatred, or protecting
individual reputation. In deciding whether to uphold a limit on expression, the courts must make a
judgment about the reasonable trade-off between these competing public/civic values or interests.
66
I have discussed elsewhere the distinction between civic and spiritual spheres of life:
Moon, Freedom of Conscience, id., and R. Moon, “Freedom of Religion under the Charter of Rights:
The Limits of State Neutrality” (2012) 45 UBC L. Rev. 495-545, at 497. Where the line between the
civic and spiritual elements of a religious belief system is drawn by the courts will reflect their views
about the nature of human welfare, and the proper scope of political action. The claim that a
religious belief or value may play a role in political decision-making when there is a parallel secular
argument (when the same or a similar position can be stated in non-religious terms) points to this
distinction between spiritual and civic. When a religious value or position (supporting the
eradication of poverty or banning drug use, public nudity, or abortion) has a secular analogue, it will
be seen as addressing a public or civic concern — as seeking to advance the public interest or to
prevent harm to others. Even if these reasons are set out in scripture (and valued by believers on that
basis) they can be understood by non-believers as concerned with public welfare, and so as civic
values. However, when there is no parallel secular argument, we are likely to see the religious
position as simply a matter of honouring God’s will. In other words, a religiously motivated action
will be viewed as a spiritual practice (as the worshipping or honouring of God) if non-adherents
cannot understand it as relating to human welfare. If the state were to support Sunday Sabbath
observance or a particular form of prayer or the wearing of hijab or if it were to ban the consumption
of pork, it would be seen as supporting a spiritual practice contrary to freedom of religion. These
actions are viewed as exclusively spiritual, as acts of worship, because they cannot be understood by
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Religious practices (forms of worship) that are “personal” in character
are sometimes indirectly or incidentally limited by state action. In such
cases, the courts may require the state to compromise in a minor way its
pursuit of a particular objective to make space for the religious practice,
without directly challenging the state’s authority to govern in the public
interest and to establish public norms. The courts, in seeking to protect
religious life, may sometimes carve out “private” space for a religious
practice (that is viewed as personal to the individual), by drawing the line
between spiritual and civic, so that the practice is exempted from the
application of an otherwise justified law. A police uniform requirement
may have the effect of excluding individuals who wear head coverings
for religious reasons or a school schedule may not take account of the
holidays of some religious groups. An exemption to a uniform
requirement made for an individual who wears a turban or hijab as an
expression of his or her faith or identity will have an impact on state
policy, but only a minor one. Allowing a government employee to take a
day off work for a religious holiday that is not included in the list of
statutory holidays will not disrupt the unit’s operations in any significant
way. These practices may be viewed as personal and treated as private
since they are not concerned directly with public policy and do not
noticeably compromise the state’s objectives.67
3. The Autonomy of Religious Organizations
Sometimes the accommodation claim is made not by an individual,
who is seeking exemption for a specific practice, but instead by a
religious organization or institution, which is insisting upon significant
autonomy in the governance of its internal affairs. In these institutional
autonomy cases, the key question for the courts is whether the
exemption from state law will impact the rights and interests of nonmembers — of outsiders to the spiritual community. The right of the
Catholic Church, for example, to exclude women from the priesthood
(to discriminate against women) is not decided by balancing the
non-believers as advancing human good. If lawmakers are permitted to draw on particular religious
values when formulating public policy, they should also be free to reject or repudiate these values. In
other words, (religiously grounded) civic values should be neither excluded nor insulated from
political judgment.
67
Moreover, we know that police or other uniform requirements or statutory holidays often
reflect, or already take account of, the cultural and religious practices of historically dominant
groups.

(2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d)

LSBC v. TWU

357

religious claim or interest against the claim to gender equality. As a
private religious organization or institution, the Catholic church should
be free to govern its internal affairs according to its own rules or norms
and not be subject to public anti-discrimination requirements. Similarly,
a religious school may dismiss a teacher who enters a same-sex
relationship contrary to church doctrine, not because the religious
interests of the group or school outweigh the public value of sexual
orientation equality but simply because the school is understood to be a
private religious organization.68
The courts have generally treated religious organizations as voluntary
associations (of individuals pursuing common ends) that should be free
to operate as they choose. If the members of a group have voluntarily
submitted to the group’s rules or decision-making processes, then the
state ordinarily ought not to intervene. An individual’s membership in the
group may be seen as voluntary as long as she/he is free to leave
the group (and live under ordinary state law) if she/he disagrees with the
group’s actions. But, of course, individuals are often born into religious
communities and feel bound to the community by ties of kinship and
friendship. More significantly, the individual’s identity may be tied to the
group so that exit is difficult even when there are few material barriers.
The state then may sometimes intervene in the affairs of a religious
community characterized by hierarchy and insularity, when that
community seeks to enforce practices that are thought to be harmful to
some of its members, even though the members have, in at least a formal
sense, chosen to be or to remain part of the community.69 The deep
communal connections that are an important part of the value of religious
life and commitment (a source of meaning and value for adherents) may
also be the source of what the courts regard as harm — the lack of
meaningful choice or opportunity open to the members of such
communities or the oppression of vulnerable group members.70 In most
of these institutional autonomy cases, though, the issue is simply this: do
the actions of the organization impact outsiders to the group — a matter
68
See Caldwell v. St. Thomas Aquinas High School, [1984] S.C.J. No. 62, [1984] 2
S.C.R. 603 (S.C.C.).
69
For an extended discussion of the limits of exit, see R. Moon, Freedom of Conscience
and Religion (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014), ch 4.
70
I have elsewhere explored this tension between these two views of religious groups — as
a voluntary association and as a source of identity for its members. The protection of the group’s
autonomy rests on the group being viewed in both these ways — even if they are not entirely
compatible perspectives: id.
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of drawing the line between the civil sphere (of government action) and
the private or communal sphere (of religious practice).
The issue in, the LSBC v. TWU case then, is whether the School (in
operating a law program) should be viewed as a private/voluntary
religious institution that is free to govern itself according to its own
norms, or whether it should be viewed as public, or at least as performing
some form of public role, and appropriately subject to public antidiscrimination norms (because its actions directly impact outsiders to the
religious group). Another, more specific, way to frame the issue is to ask,
if the TWU program is accredited, whether the Covenant should be
viewed as an internal rule (a rule that applies to the internal operations of
a voluntary religious association) or as a rule that applies to individuals
who are not part of (or have not simply chosen to be members of) the
TWU spiritual community.
The majority judges assumed that, if TWU were to run an accredited
law program, its religious norms, including the Covenant’s ban on samesex relationships, would be enforced against outsiders to the religious
community.71 The dissenting judges, in contrast, viewed TWU as a
private organization and all its actions, therefore, as private/internal in
character and properly insulated from public norms. Indeed, the
dissenting judges seemed baffled that the majority could think otherwise.
But that is precisely the issue at stake. At no point did the dissenting
judges consider the impact of the TWU program on entry to legal
practice — except to say that — the exclusion of gay and lesbian
students from TWU’s proposed law school is the result simply of the
Legislature’s accommodation of the TWU community.72

71
Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32,
[2018] 2 S.C.R. 293, at para. 101 (S.C.C.):
...Being required by someone else’s religious beliefs to behave contrary to one’s sexual
identity is degrading and disrespectful. Being required to do so offends the public
perception that freedom of religion includes freedom from religion.
And, id., at para. 103 (emphasis in original):
...The refusal to approve TWU’s proposed law school prevents concrete, not abstract,
harms to LGBTQ people and to the public in general. The LSBC’s decision ensures that
equal access to the legal profession is not undermined and prevents the risk of significant
harm to LGBTQ people who feel they have no choice but to attend TWU’s proposed law
school.
72
Id., at para. 35.
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V. IS TWU A PRIVATE RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION?
The question of whether TWU, in operating an accredited law
program, should be viewed as public or private, or its covenant as civic
action or internal regulation, is not an easy one. Religious organizations
operate in the larger world and their actions will almost always have
some impact on outsiders. The question is what kind or degree of impact
is sufficient to say that the organization is no longer operating as simply
a private/voluntary religious association?
According to its mandate and objectives, TWU is a religious
institution.73 Yet, as Rowe J. pointed out,
...Although TWU teaches from a Christian perspective, its statutory
mandate requires that its admissions policy not be restricted to
Christian students. … TWU admits students from all faiths and permits
them to hold diverse opinions on moral, ethical, and religious issues.74

Moreover, the School has special privileges granted to it by the state. It
has the power to grant degrees. It is eligible to apply for money under
various infrastructure programs. Its students are eligible for statesupported grants and loans. Yet none of these seem (or has been thought)
to make TWU “public”, and subject to non-discrimination requirements.
The reason for this may simply be that there are plenty of undergraduate
places open to students.
But TWU now wants to train lawyers and so is seeking accreditation
for a law program. TWU can, of course, run a law program without law
society approval but its graduates will not be eligible to practice law, or
at least they will only be eligible if they go through some additional
steps. The LSO and the LSBC have not issued a general condemnation of
TWU and its beliefs about homosexuality. They have not sought to
interfere with the operation of TWU as a Christian university. They have
simply refused to accredit TWU’s law program — a program that in their
judgment would have an exclusionary impact on gays and lesbians
73

As noted in Victor M. Muñiz-Fraticelli, “The (Im)possibility of Christian Education”
(2016), 75 S.C.L.R. (2d) 209-221, at 216, TWU seemed to argue against its own interests when it
claimed to be public and accessible.
74
Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32,
[2018] 2 S.C.R. 293, at para. 240 (S.C.C.). He continued: “... TWU itself states that it is open to ‘all
students who qualify for admission, recognizing that not all affirm the theological views that are
vital to the University’s Christian identity’: TWU Covenant, A.R., vol. IV, at p. 539.” This point was
earlier made by Kathryn Chan, “Identifying the Institutional Religious Freedom Claimant” (2017) 95
C.B.R. 707.

360

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d)

seeking entry into the legal profession. The LSO and LSBC consider the
accredited law schools to be part of the system for selecting and training
lawyers. At the same time, TWU as a religious institution, should not be
denied access to a public good or a role in the public sphere.
Admission to law school has often been seen as a significant gateway
to the profession in Canada. Admission has been competitive, with only a
small percentage of applicants gaining entry to law school.75 Until
recently, at least, once someone was admitted to law school they were
almost certainly going to be called to the bar, since failure rates at both
law school and the bar exams were very low. If accredited law schools
play an important role in determining who enters the legal profession in
Canada, then the accreditation of the TWU program would mean that its
norms (and, in particular, its covenant) will be applied to individuals who
have not simply chosen to be part of the TWU spiritual community and
will have the effect of excluding gay and lesbian students from the
profession. In establishing requirements for admission into the law
program, TWU will be performing a role that impacts individuals outside
the religious community. If this is so, then it must be permissible for a
law society, when deciding whether to accredit a program, to consider
whether the program’s admission policy is discriminatory.
But is it still the case that law school admission is a significant
gateway to the profession? There is at least a case to be made that it is
not. Any institution of higher education, either private or public, that
wants to deliver a law program is free to apply to the various law
societies for accreditation. TWU, quite understandably, argues that the
unwillingness of other bodies or institutions to establish a law program
should not affect its ability to do so. The limited number of law school
places is not TWU’s responsibility. At the same time, though, the law
societies do not create law schools and must decide whether to accredit a
program that is proposed by a public or private university in the current
context of limited law school places.
75
Elaine Craig, “TWU Law: A Reply to Proponents of Approval” (Fall, 2014) 37
Dalhousie L.J. 621, at 633:
... The argument that gays and lesbians can simply go elsewhere to become lawyers is
problematic. As TWU noted in its effort to demonstrate to the BC government that there
is a need for more law schools in the province: ‘Canada has the lowest number of law
schools per capita of any Commonwealth country.... [Applications] currently vastly
outnumber the spaces available. Law school seats are a finite public good. Some LGBTQ
students may not have the option to attend another Canadian law school. Moreover, as a
matter of equality, meaningful access to a legal education in Canada should not differ
depending on a student’s sexual orientation.
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There have, at least until recently, been relatively few law schools in
Canada, first because private universities are exceptional here, and
second, because provincial governments have been reluctant to fund new
law programs in public universities. But that may be changing. In the last
few years new law schools have been established and granted funding by
the provinces.76 Several existing law schools have increased the number
of students they accept into their first year program. Perhaps admission
to law school is no longer a (the) significant barrier to entry to the legal
profession — because, on the one side, there are so many accredited law
school places in Canada (and it is increasingly possible to study abroad
and be admitted to practice in Canada), and, on the other side, graduation
from law school no longer ensures employment as a lawyer in Canada.
And of course there are other significant barriers to law school entry that
receive far less attention from the law societies — most notably the very
high cost of tuition at many accredited schools, which recent evidence
suggests has had the effect of excluding students from less well-off
backgrounds.77
I am doubtful that this claim (that law school admission is no longer a
significant barrier to the profession) is credible in the current context of
legal education in Canada. Nevertheless, it does highlight the difficulty
in determining when the actions of a “private” religious institution
impact the public interest or the interests of individuals outside the
community to a degree that precludes the institution from claiming
autonomy under section 2(a).
If, as the dissenting judges assumed, TWU is a private religious
institution, then it would be free to discriminate in its admissions not just
against gays and lesbians but also against women and racial minorities.
A private religious university could exclude women (or married women,
or women with children) from its law program if it believed that a
woman’s role is to care for her children and to provide support in the
home for her husband. Such a school could also expel individuals who
engaged in interracial dating, if it was opposed for religious reasons to
76
For example, the law schools at Thompson Rivers University and Lakehead University.
Ryerson University is intending to open a law school in 2020 — but will do so without government
funding. See D. Newman, “On the Trinity Western University Controversy: An argument for a
Christian Law School in Canada”, 22 Constitutional Forum (2015), at 6, which argues that there are
lots of law school places now.
77
A. Jerome, “Report on law school tuition highlights impact of high costs on access,
diversity”, The Lawyer’s Daily (February 5, 2019), online: <http://www.thelawyersdaily.ca/
articles/10102/report-on-law-school-tuition-highlights-impact-of-high-costs-on-access-diversity>.
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“race-mixing”. Perhaps TWU’s assertion of autonomy in this case has
resonance only because as a community we remain ambivalent about
sexual orientation equality or we still cannot quite let go of the idea that a
ban on same-sex intimacy is a restriction on behaviour (that an individual
can refrain from engaging in) rather than an act of discrimination against
gays and lesbians.

VI. THE REMOVAL OF THE COVENANT
Not long after the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision, TWU
announced that it would no longer require students to sign the
Covenant.78 This presumably was done in response to the clear signal
given by the law societies and by the Court that the Covenant was the
only thing preventing accreditation of the TWU program.79
But even with the removal of the Covenant, there remain two
significant concerns about the program’s accessibility. The first is that
TWU, as a conservative evangelical Christian institution, will remain a
hostile place for gay and lesbian students. Even if students are no longer
asked to sign an undertaking that they will refrain from same-sex
intimacy, the spiritual community will continue to view homosexuality as
sinful, morally corrupt, or unnatural.80 This is hardly a welcoming
environment for gays and lesbians, even if they are not formally
excluded from the program.
78
W. Stueck & S. Dhillon, “B.C.’s Trinity Western University drops mandatory covenant
forbidding sex outside heterosexual marriage”, The Globe and Mail, online:
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/british-columbia/article-bcs-trinity-western-universitydrops-mandatory-covenant-forbidding/>.
79
See, for example, McLachlin C.J.C. in Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity
Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 293, at para. 145 (S.C.C.): “... If the
community wishes to operate a law school, it must relinquish the mandatory Covenant it says is core
to its religious beliefs, with the attendant ramifications on religious practices.”
80
V.M. Muñiz-Fraticelli, “The (Im)possibility of Christian Education” (2016), 75 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 209-221, at 219 recognizes that this commitment by TWU does not disappear simply with the
removal of the covenant:
...Given how fundamental the biblical conception of marriage is to TWU’s identity, the
alternative to TWU Law School with the discriminatory CCA [covenant] is not TWU
Law School without the CCA. The alternative is no TWU Law School at all, and thus no
additional places for straight or LGBTQ, religious or secular students. The university is
founded on a religious mission — however objectionable some part of it may be to the
mainstream of Canadian society. It is a branch of the church. From TWU’s perspective, it
would be incoherent to claim a Christian identity but not enforce norms that ensure that
TWU remains a Christian space, and not merely as a school substantively identical to all
others that is merely administered by Evangelicals.
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Second, TWU, if it is to be the kind of Christian institution it wants to
be, must favour conservative Christian applicants in its admission
process. How this will occur is not clear — but it will occur. The TWU
program is hypothetical, and so we know little about its admission
criteria. TWU wants to create an evangelical Christian law school for
Christian students who will then practise as Christian lawyers. Yet, if
TWU intends to be such a school, then its admission process will have to
take into account more than just LSAT (Law School Admittance Test)
scores and GPA (grade point average).
Perhaps TWU assumes that only Christians will apply to its program.
But, as long as law school places are limited in number, it is likely that
non-Christians will apply to TWU. If that is the case then TWU will
either choose the strongest students (academically) and its mission will
be defeated, or it will give preference to Christian applicants and in
doing so will exclude some students from its program on grounds that
might be viewed as discriminatory. Either directly or indirectly it appears
that Christian students will be favoured in admission to TWU’s program.
If it is objectionable to exclude gay and lesbian students, is it not also
objectionable to exclude non-Christian students? There is a difference
though between discrimination against gays and lesbians and
discrimination against non-Christians. While gays and lesbians represent
a historically marginalized group, the same cannot be said about the
general and diverse group that includes everyone who is not an
evangelical Christian, even if this general group encompasses the
members of various religious minorities.

VII. THE FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
There has been lots of handwringing in academic circles about what
the TWU decision means for religious freedom in Canada, and more
particularly for the freedom or autonomy of religious associations.
I suspect, though, that it means very little, other than that the application
of freedom of religion in future cases remains unpredictable. This will be
so until the Court recognizes that the key issue in accommodation cases
is not the just or appropriate balance between competing religious and
public interests, but is instead the boundary between the civic and
spiritual spheres of life.
As long as the Court seeks to resolve religious freedom issues within
the standard model of Charter adjudication that focuses on balancing or
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proportionality it will go through the motions of balancing and engage in
a superficial trading-off of competing interests — giving weight to that
which has no weight, or arbitrarily discounting one side or the other of
the balance, in order to reach a result that seems intuitively correct. In
other words, the balancing/proportionality process allows the Court to
avoid providing any real justification or explanation for its conclusion in
a particular case.
For many religious adherents, their spiritual life is not simply an
expression of personal belief, but is instead lived and sustained in
community. Indeed, from a civic-secular perspective, it is difficult to
account for the constitutional protection of religious practice or spiritual
life without understanding its communal character – the deep tie between
the individual and the religious community or tradition with which
she/he associates.

